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RESUMEN: El propósito de este trabajo es abordar qué noción de objeto geométrico y figura geométrica 
tenemos en diferentes tipos de geometría: práctica, pura y aplicada. Además, abordamos la relación entre 
objetos geométricos y figuras cuando esto es posible, como es el caso de la geometría pura y aplicada. En 
la geometría práctica resulta que no existe una concepción del objeto geométrico. 
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ABSTRACT: The purpose of this work is to address what notion of geometrical object and geometrical figure 
we have in different kinds of geometry: practical, pure, and applied. Also, we address the relation between 
geometrical objects and figures when this is possible, which is the case of pure and applied geometry. In 
practical geometry it turns out that there is no conception of geometrical object.  
KEYWORDS: geometry, sortal concepts, geometrical object, geometrical figure. 
 
§1. Introduction  
 
The role of diagrams in mathematics, and in particular in Euclid’s pure geometry has been 
addressed in many works.1 Here, we are interested in a very particular subject: that of the 
conception of geometrical object or geometrical figure and their relation, when this is the 
case. We adopt the term geometrical figure to identify simple drawings like the drawing 
of a segment, a circle, a square, a rectangle, or a triangle. The term diagram is reserved 
for composite drawings in which we combine several figures. One example is the famous 
diagram in the proposition 1 of book 1 of the Elements (I.1). This diagram can be seen as 
composed of several segment figures and two circle figures (see figure 1 below).2  
     In this work, we will consider three kinds of (planar) geometries: the practical 
geometry of ancient Mesopotamia, the pure geometry of ancient Greece, and ancient 
Greek applied geometry. The objective of the work is to make precise the differences, in 
these geometries, in the conception of geometrical object or geometrical figure, and their 
relation. For that purpose, we adopt Panza’s approach to geometrical objects and 
diagrams in Euclid’s Elements (Panza 2012). Panza’s approach enables to make precise 
what we might regard as the intuitive grasp of the differences regarding objects and 
figures that we find when comparing practical, pure, and applied geometry. 
     In section 2 we address the sortal conception of geometrical objects and their 
representation by geometrical figures in Euclid’s Elements, focusing in particular in the 
attributes of objects resulting from their conceptualization and those inherited from the 
figures. Section 3 addresses geometrical figures in the practical geometry of ancient 
 
1 For reviews see, e.g., Shin, Lemon, and Mumma (2018); Giardino (2017). 
2 The term ‘geometrical figure’ corresponds to Panza’s ‘elementary diagram’ (see Panza 
2012, p. 72). 
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Mesopotamia and the lack of a conceptualization of geometrical objects. Section 4 
addresses the applied geometry of Euclid’s Optics, focusing on new layers of 
representation arising in applied geometry. 
 
§2. On geometrical objects and figures in the planar geometry of the Elements 
 
For our purpose, it is not necessary to have a clear notion of geometrical object. For 
example, we could think of a geometrical object, adopting a Platonic view, as a purely 
ideal one or, adopting an Aristotelian view, as an abstraction from a concrete one (Panza 
2012, 57, footnote 5). The relevant features we will be interested in are the relation of a 
geometrical object to a concept and its relation to a geometrical figure. 
     Panza takes geometrical concepts to be sortal concepts.3 Accordingly, «the assertion 
that some objects fall or do not fall under them is meaningful» (Panza 2011, p. 46). How 
do we have, e.g., a sortal concept of circle? This concept, like any other, is characterized 
by what we might call the application conditions and the identity conditions of the object 
—in this case, the geometrical circle— that falls under it (see, e.g., Panza and Sereni 2013, 
pp. 100-1; Hale 2013, p. 176, footnote 29). In this way: 
 
«The former are necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to fall under this concept 
[and] the latter are necessary and sufficient conditions for the objects that fall under this 
concept to be distinct from each other». (Panza 2011, p. 46) 
 
Panza develops his views on geometrical concepts in relation to the first six books of 
Euclid’s Elements and Euclid’s Data. According to Panza, in relation to equilateral 
triangles: 
 
«Definitions I.19–20 of the Elements fix the application conditions of the concept of 
equilateral triangle. They do it by stating that equilateral triangles are rectilinear figures 
contained by three equal segments. (I understand this statement in this way: an object 
falls under the concept of equilateral triangle if and only if it is a rectilinear figure 
contained by three equal segments). These same definitions do not provide, however, 
identity conditions for the objects that possibly fall under this concept. Moreover, they 
provide neither a warrant that some objects actually fall under it nor appropriate norms 
for obtaining some such objects». (Panza 2011, p. 47) 
 
The application conditions of the concept of circle are determined in the definitions 15 
and 16 of book 1 of the Elements: 
 
 
3 For a brief account of the notion of sortal concept see, e.g., Mackie (2006, pp. 118-21). 
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«A circle is a plane figure contained by one line such that all the straight lines falling 
upon it from one point among those lying within the figure are equal to one another; and 
the point is called the center of the circle». (Euclid 1956, pp. 153-4)4 
  
However, we still need the identity conditions of the concept of circle. Also, if we do not 
consider the object to be given before the concept, we need «a warrant that some objects 
fall under the relevant concept, and/or some norms for obtaining some such objects» 
(Panza 2011, p. 47) (e.g., we might have the sortal concept of flying saucer but not a 
warrant that some ‘object’ falls under it; see Panza 2011, p. 46, footnote 8). According to 
Panza, in relation to equilateral triangles, «the warrant that some objects actually fall 
under the concept of equilateral triangle is provided by the solution of proposition I.1 of 
the Elements» (Panza 2011, p. 48). In the case of the circle, this warrant is given by the 
third postulate of the Elements: 
 
«Let the following be postulated: to draw a straight line from any point to any point. To 
produce a finite straight line continuously in a straight line. To describe a circle with any 
center and distance». (Euclid 1956, p. 154)5 
 
Notice that here we are not simply saying that we are allowed to draw a circle as a figure, 
e.g., using a compass. Interpreting ‘circle’ in terms of a geometrical object, we would be 
drawing a figure —a circle figure— that has a particular representation relation with the 
geometrical object that we call circle, but which is distinct from the drawn figure. As we 
can see in the application conditions for the concept of circle under which the object must 
fall, the concept of circle (and its instantiation as a geometrical object) is that of an object 
for which all radii are exactly equal (this cannot be the case for a drawn figure; in this 
case we can only have a measured equality which has always associated an uncertainty; 
see section 3). 
     Regarding the identity conditions for the circle (as a geometrical object), we must 
consider the special kind of representation made by diagrams in the Elements; i.e., the 
relation between the circle as a figure or diagram and the circle as a geometrical object. 
According to Panza, geometrical figures or diagrams have a two-fold role in the Elements.  
On one hand, the identity conditions of the concept under which falls an object «are 
provided by the identity conditions of the diagram that represents [the object]» (Panza 
2012, p. 57). For example, in I.1 we draw two contour-closed curves, each of these figures 
provides the identity conditions enabling to identify and distinguish the geometrical 
objects each one represents (see figure 1). That is, when we identify —or provide an 
individual reference to— each circle figure as a particular one (the circle ACE and the 
circle BCD) and at the same time distinguish them, we are also identifying and 
distinguishing the corresponding geometrical circles ACE and BCD. On the other hand, 
the geometrical object, in this case the geometrical circle, «inherits some properties and 
 
4 Taking a ‘cue’ from Netz (1999, p. 94), we do not present the definitions or postulates 
numbered and separated in lines.  
5 We reproduce as a continuous piece of prose the first three postulates of the Elements. 
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relations from these diagrams» (Panza 2012, p. 58).6 In the case under consideration, the 
continuity of the geometrical circle and the fact that the circles cross at a point C is 
inherited from the concrete continuity and crossing of the circle figures. Accordingly: 
 
«Continuity is a diagrammatic property of [geometrical circles] to the effect that they are 
continuous just because the concrete lines that represent them are taken to be so»; (Panza 
2012, p. 76) 
 
and: 
 
«These circles meet in a point C, which, so to say, pops up, because of the physical 
properties of the lines that have been drawn or imagined. The point is, indeed, represented 
by the intersection of these lines». (Panza 2011, p. 51) 
 
Figure 1. The diagram in I.1 of the Elements. 
 
There is a subtle point regarding this last part. It is related to an attribute of geometrical 
objects resulting from the application conditions of the geometrical concepts in the 
Elements, which Ferreirós calls «the “Euclidean” idealizations» (Ferreirós 2016, p. 123). 
This can be noticed already in the first three definitions of the Elements. According to 
definitions 1 to 3, «a point is that which has no part. A line is breadthless length. The 
extremities of a line are points» (Euclid 1956, p. 153).7 According to Ferreirós: 
 
«The first definitions indeed suggest a way of reading diagrams, a perspective for seeing 
or conceiving what is implied by a diagram, and what is not. And this way of reading is 
not at all evident, especially if one previously knows only practical geometry. For the 
definitions and the reading that comes with them lead the practitioner to certain crucial 
idealizations. More importantly, the definitions suggest certain forms of response (and of 
indifference) to some aspects of the diagram: thus, the crossing of two drawn lines will 
be a (very small) planar region, but we are taught to disregard this and consider in the 
argumentation that one and only one point has thus been determined». (Ferreirós 2016, p. 
144).8 
 
In terms of Panza’s approach, it is still the case that the crossing of geometrical circles is 
inherited from the concrete continuity and crossing of the circle figures. However, that 
 
6 Following Panza, we will use sometimes the term ‘attribute’ when referring either to 
properties or relations (Panza 2012, p. 75). 
7 The ‘Euclidean’ idealizations imply that «a point is characterized as a non-measurable 
entity, as it has no parts that can measure it […] a line is measurable with respect to its 
length, while it is non-measurable with respect to its breadth» (Harari 2003, p. 18). 
8 In a footnote, Ferreirós mentions that «indifference and responsiveness to features of 
representations is a topic that I have seen Manders elaborate on in an unpublished 
conference» (Ferreirós 2016, p. 144). 
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this crossing is made at a point results not from the diagram but directly from the 
idealization imprinted to the geometrical concepts. We have, so to speak, a dialog 
between the geometrical object and its corresponding geometrical figure (and diagram 
where it is embedded). The geometrical object inherits properties and relations from the 
drawn diagrams but is reinterpreted in terms of the attributes of the geometrical sortal 
concepts.9 
     Another important attribute of geometrical objects in the context of the Elements 
derives from their implicit treatment in several parts of the propositions in terms of 
magnitudes (which are explicitly addressed in books 5 and 6). According to Mueller: 
 
«The most appropriate interpretation of magnitudes in the Elements involves construing 
them as abstractions from geometrical objects which leave out of account all properties 
of those objects except quantity: i.e. length for lines, area for plane figures, volume for 
solids, size, however characterized, for angles». (Mueller 1981, p. 121) 
 
As we can see in the application conditions of the sortal concept of circle as expressed in 
definitions 15 and 16, a circle is such that all radii are exactly equal. Here, the attribute 
of radii (geometrical segments) as magnitudes is essential. In fact, throughout the book 1 
we can notice that segments can be taken to be equal (e.g. in I.1), or one being greater 
than or less than another (e.g. in I.2). That is, an attribute of geometrical objects as 
magnitudes is the possibility of establishing «the relation of equality and order» (Panza 
2012, p. 77).      
     Addressing circles as magnitudes together with the idealization that the circumference 
or radii of the circle are breadthless lengths is in fact at the crux of the sortal concept of 
circle. As mentioned by Ferreirós:  
 
«The object [of geometry] is the diagram as perceived and interpreted, in light of the 
idealizations and exact conditions superimposed on it by the text, by Euclid’s theoretical 
framework. Hence, the figure studied by the geometer is the ideal type [the geometrical 
object], not the empirical token [the diagram]». (Ferreirós 2016, p. 139) 
 
No circle figure can ever have radii drawn exactly equal or have a circumference whose 
intersection with another curve is a point. This is particularly clear in the simple case of 
the exact equality of geometrical segments. This does not mean «that the concrete lines 
that represent them are so» (Panza 2012, p. 77). Two drawn lines cannot be exactly equal; 
the most we can achieve is to consider them as practically equal when considering the 
uncertainty in the length measurements to be negligible (see section 3). We see that the 
geometrical object called circle cannot be confused with a drawing called circle. The 
 
9 In this work, we only address planar geometry, as Panza does. Our figures and objects 
are planar. The Euclidean plane can be seen as another instance of idealization, e.g., of a 
practically planar surface where drawings were made (possibly a dusted surface, a wax 
tablet, or others; see, e.g., Netz 1999, pp. 14-6). 
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sortal concept of circle in the Elements cannot correspond to an actual circle (e.g. a figure 
or a shape).  
    We find Panza’s framework, who was conceived for Euclidean planar geometry, a 
valuable analytical tool to interpret other forms of geometry and compared between them. 
In the following sections we will address (aspects of) the geometry of ancient 
Mesopotamia and ancient Greek applied geometry, in relation to ancient Greek pure 
geometry, in the light of Panza’s approach. 
 
 
§3. On geometrical figures in the geometry of ancient Mesopotamia 
 
Several tablets from ancient Mesopotamia bear witness of the use of some sort of compass 
to draw the geometrical figure we call circle; we also find a clear depiction of what we 
call the center of the circle. Could this mean that the conceptualization of circle in ancient 
Mesopotamia was, e.g., like that of Ptolemy that conceptualized the circle in terms of a 
diameter rotating about its center? (Robson 2004, p. 20) 
     Circles like other geometrical figures were conceptualized in terms of their boundaries. 
According to Robson «a circle was the shape contained within an equidistant 
circumference» (Robson 2004, p. 20). As it is, the name for circumference and for circle 
was the same, and, in fact, corresponded to that of the circumference. It meant «thing that 
curves» (Robson 2004, p. 20). The length of the circumference like the length of other 
horizontal lines is measurable in terms of a ‘sanctioned’ length unit or subunit; for 
example, in the Old Babylonian period an important unit of length was the ninda or rod, 
corresponding approximately to 6 meters (Cooper 2013, p. 403).10 To measure the length 
of a circumference considered, e.g., as the concrete boundary of a circular oven (Cooper 
2013, p. 404), one uses a rope with a defined length.11 The length of the circumference is 
then given in terms of what we might call a measure number (Gonçalves 2015, p. 14). 
     What about the area of a circle? The notion of area, for which is used the word 
corresponding to a field plot in a slightly technical sense (Høyrup 2002, pp. 35-6), was 
not conceived directly in terms of the measure number of a unit area. That is, the ‘surface’   
of, e.g., a field is not thought as being covered with unit squares (each one corresponding 
to the same measure number of one base unit in the adopted area metrological system). 
The numerical value of the area of, e.g., a field or planar shape, was determined from the 
measure numbers of the boundary (Damerow 2016, p. 101). In this way, e.g., for 
quadrilateral field plots (or figures), surveyors calculated the area of the field using the 
so-called surveyors’ formula in which the area is given by the multiplication of the mean 
values of the two sets of two opposite sides; i.e., as (A + B)/2 x (C+ D)/2, in which A, B, 
and C, D, are opposite sides of a quadrilateral (Damerow 2016, pp. 106-7). The notion of 
the area of geometrical figures derives from this notion from practical geometry 
 
10 For details on the (changing) ancient Mesopotamian metrological systems see, e.g., 
Robson (2008, pp. 291-5). 
11 The use of ropes as instruments to measure length is attested, e.g., in Robson (2008, 
pp. 120-2) and Baker (2011, pp. 296-7). 
 7 
(Damerow 2016, pp. 115-7). Like for any other figure, the area of a circle is determined 
by the length of its boundary; it is given by the square of the length of the circumference 
divided by 12 (Robson 2004, p. 18). 
     Let us look into ancient Mesopotamian mathematical problems in the light of their 
practical geometry. Let us consider a mathematical problem like the one in tablet MS 
3051. Here, we have an equilateral triangle inscribed in a circle, whose circumference is 
drawn using a compass (see figure 2).12 Some conventions must be taken into account to 
understand the problem. One is that in Old Babylonian mathematical texts it is implicit 
that the length of a circumference is 1 00 ninda (60 ninda). The area of a circle with a 
circumference of 60 ninda is, as given by the formula for the circle’s area, 5 00 sar (300 
sar) (Friberg 2007, p. 207). 
 
Figure 2. Reproduction of the drawing in tablet MS 3051. 
 
How should we consider the circle drawn in tablet MS 3051? Is it a representation of a 
geometrical object? In fact, what notion of geometrical object might we consider in this 
context? There is a sense in which the circle in MS 3051 is a representation. The tablet is 
small, it has a couple of centimeters of width and length (Friberg 2007, p. 190). Evidently, 
if by convention the circumference is taken to have a length of 60 ninda, the drawing is 
representing a larger figure. But if we had actually drawn this figure, e.g., with a peg at 
the center and using a rope with 10 ninda (60 meters) to which we attach, e.g., a small 
stick (to enable to draw the circle in the ground), what is this that we drew? A 
representation of a geometrical object? In the context of a practical geometry, a circle, 
like other planar geometrical figures, has concrete instantiations, e.g., as the boundary of 
a field. When we draw or mark this boundary, we are literally given shape to a portion of 
land by creating a frontier that separates it from the outside. The shape determines the 
inside —our figure. We can certainly consider some notions of shapes previous to the 
conceptualization proper. A notion of circular shape is manifested in early Mesopotamian 
visual culture in sketchy drawings or in the form given to some artifacts (see, e.g., Robson 
2008, pp. 45-6; Frankfort 1970, pp. 17-37). By the time of the Old Babylonian period we 
already assist to a conceptualization of the geometrical figure (Robson 2004). This has 
several components. That the circle is conceptualized is made explicit by naming it. As 
mentioned, the conceptualization is made in terms of a boundary —the circumference— 
giving shape to the figure that we name after it. The circle can be related to a concrete 
instantiation, like a circular oven that is determined by a circumference, but it can also be 
related to a small drawing on a surface like the clay tablet. The drawings can be very 
sketchy but also quite precise (see, e.g., Friberg 2007, p. 190). This precision in the 
drawing is obtained by using a particular instrument to draw the circle —a compass 
(Høyrup 2002, p. 105; Friberg 2007, p. 207). To the circle, we have associated several 
numbers, the most important of which is the length of the circumference, which can be 
measured. The area, the diameter, and the radius can be calculated from the measured 
 
12 For a reproduction of a picture of tablet MS 3051 see, e.g., Friberg (2007, p. 488). 
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length of the circumference (however we might consider measuring directly the lengths 
of the diameter and the radius).  
     As we have seen, to the geometrical figure drawn in a tablet is attributed the measure 
number of 60 ninda. For our purpose, we might as well consider the actual measure 
number of the drawn circumference. From our contemporary perspective, an important 
thing is that in relation to experimentation a measure number cannot be exact. There is 
always an uncertainty associated with any measurement. To say that the length of the 
circumference is 60 ninda is a shortcut to say that the measurement gave the result 60 ± 
the uncertainty, in which the uncertainty depends on the precision of the measuring 
instrument (Hughes and Hase 2010, pp. 2-6). A contemporary counterpart of an Old 
Babylonian circle would be a drawing made with precision instruments that enabled the 
uncertainty to be very small in relation to the measured value of the length of the 
circumference.       
     Can we consider a practically constructed circle a representation of a geometrical 
object? To address this issue, we need to determine what kind of concept of circle we 
have in Old Babylonian mathematics. We do not have application conditions in the form 
of a definition —we only have a name. Naming the circle is only meaningful, e.g., when 
considered in relation to a drawn figure. It cannot be considered as an application 
condition on its own. We might consider the practical procedure of drawing a circle —
using a compass— as our application condition. However, this ‘application condition’ 
refers directly to the drawn figure, not to anything else. Taking the construction of a circle 
using a specific instrument as its application conditions would mean that we already have 
a warrant that the figure falls under the concept. This can be seen the other way around. 
The possibility of drawing a circle with a compass —its warrant— is at the same time its 
application condition. Considering this ‘charitable’ view on application conditions, what 
about identity conditions?  In a way similar to that of the Elements, we might consider 
that a circle figure gives a sort of identity conditions of the concept of circle. However, 
this does not imply, by itself, that there is a geometrical object that falls under the concept. 
These identity conditions are related to the drawing itself. Lacking application conditions 
that, so to speak, go beyond the drawn figure, as such, the drawing might refer only to 
itself and not to some object that falls under the concept. 
     The point is that we do not have a sortal concept of circle. If we try to make the 
application conditions —the necessary and sufficient conditions for an object to fall under 
the concept (Panza 2011, p. 46)— as redundant due to the priority given to the drawing 
using a compass taken as a warrant that the figure falls under the concept —in a way 
being this a warrant for having a concept by drawing figures in this very specific way—, 
the most we might arrive at is at a make-believe sortal concept of circle figure. We would 
have a sort of warrant-application condition in terms of a drawing of a contour-closed 
curve using a compass which we name ‘thing that curves’.  
     As we have seen, according to Panza, in the Elements, the identity conditions of the 
concept under which falls an object «are provided by the identity conditions of the 
diagram that represents [the object]» (Panza 2012, p. 57). Also, the geometrical object, in 
this case the geometrical circle, «inherits some properties and relations from these 
diagrams» (Panza 2012, p. 58). In the case of the drawn circle in Old Babylonian 
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geometry, we can certainly talk about the identity conditions of the figure. There are also 
properties and relations determined by the diagrams. For example, in MS 3501 we have 
the drawing of a triangle inscribed in a circle. In the Elements, an attribute like «lying 
inside» (Panza 2012, p. 76), is a relation inherited by the geometrical objects from the 
diagram. However, in Old Babylonian geometry it refers to the figures in the diagram 
directly. This is so because in ancient Mesopotamian geometry there is no sortal concept 
of geometrical circle (or equilateral triangle) in relation to which we might consider that 
the geometrical object inherits attributes from the figure or diagram. 
     The limitation, when compared with the Elements, of the practical geometrical 
conception of circle in Old Babylonian geometry is not the inexistence of a written 
definition of circle; it is the lack of idealizations and exactness attributes as given, e.g., in 
the definitions of line and circle in the Elements. This means that there is no abstract circle 
taken to be exact in ancient Mesopotamia for which the drawing might be taken to be a 
representation. As we have mentioned, a drawing can be seen as a representation of 
another drawing but nothing else. In fact, the most ‘exact’ circle we have in ancient 
Mesopotamia is a circle figure drawn with a compass. More than a ‘warrant’ the act of 
drawing a circle (or the implicit postulation that this can be done), corresponds to the 
articulation of the concept. The concept of circle is established by drawing a 
circumference, e.g., using a compass, naming it, and having implicit the conceptualization 
of planar figures in terms of the inside of a boundary that can be measured. That ancient 
Mesopotamian geometry is a practical one implies that all the lengths associated with the 
drawing are measurable. This means that we simply cannot have an attribute like ‘all radii 
are equal’ in the case of the conceptualization of circle (if it had been written out). The 
most we could achieve is to say that as measured all radii have the same measure number 
in the adopted metrological system. From our contemporary perspective we might even 
say that the uncertainty is negligible; i.e., that for practical purposes the radii are equal. 
But this refers to a very precisely drawn figure itself, not to the geometrical object it might 
be taken to represent.  
 
 
§4. Applying the geometry of the Elements: geometrical objects and figures in applied 
geometry 
 
For this section, it will suffice to look closely into the concept of segment. In ancient 
Mesopotamia, we have measurable segments. Accordingly, in mathematical problems, 
«the old Babylonian calculator represents his unknown numbers by his standard 
instruments —measurable line segments» (Høyrup 2002, p. 57). We can imagine drawing 
a line figure using a straightedge and measuring its length —as a measure number— using 
a ‘sanctioned’ rod, which corresponds to a metrological unit and possibly having marks 
for its subunits.13 When segments are in a particular relation between them as part of the 
 
13 While there is no known example of a measuring rod with marking of subunits in 
ancient Mesopotamia, there are examples from ancient Egypt. The so-called cubit-rods 
 10 
boundary of certain figures they can be named accordingly. In the case of a square, its 
name derives from ‘to confront’; the square «understood as a confrontation of equal sides 
and thus a square frame, is the side and has an area» (Høyrup 2002, p. 25). The side of a 
square in some texts is referred to as «the equalside» (Høyrup 2002, p. 26). In the case of 
rectangles, these are determined by the ‘long side’ and the ‘front’ (making reference to 
actual field plots in which the ‘front’ is the narrow side parallel to the irrigation channel; 
Høyrup 2002, p. 34). We must bear in mind that in the case of the square the ‘equalsides’ 
are not exactly equal sides, the most we can say is that they are practically equal. In the 
same sense, that one side in the rectangle is greater than or less than another is a practical 
relation of order. We might say that we establish a practical relation of order between 
measure numbers. This cannot be confused with «the relation of equality and order» 
(Panza 2012, p. 77) existing between segments as geometrical objects. Like in the case 
of the circle, it does not make sense to consider a geometrical segment that falls under a 
sortal concept of segment. We only have the figure (and some notion of segment). 
     In the case of the Elements, we can consider, following Panza, the definitions related 
to segments (or straight lines as they are called there) as giving the application conditions 
of the sortal concept of segment. The identity conditions and several attributes are given 
by segment figures that represent the geometrical segments. Again, it is an attribute of a 
geometrical segments as magnitudes the exactness of their length and the relation of order 
between geometrical segments. This entails that two segments can be exactly equal one 
to another or one being greater than or less than another. Finally, like in the case of circles, 
the postulates warrant the possibility of having geometrical segments. Again, when 
drawing a straight line using, e.g., a straightedge we are drawing a segment figure that 
represents a geometrical segment. 
     Let us now consider the geometrical segment and its representation as a drawn straight 
line in relation to Euclid’s Optics.  The underlying idea of this work is that the eyes emit 
a ‘visual fire’ described within Euclid’s geometry of rays as geometrical segments called 
‘visual rays’. The visual perception arises with the incidence of the visual rays on the 
surface of objects and the observer is taken to be aware of the directions of these visual 
rays (Darrigol 2012, p. 8).  
     As mentioned by Ferreirós, «when applying geometry, e.g., to study geometrical 
optics or mechanics, new layers of representation enter the picture» (Ferreirós 2016, p. 
124). It had already been noticed by Toulmin that the development of geometrical optics 
corresponds to «the application of new modes of representation» (Toulmin 1953, p. 43); 
it consists in a «geometrical method of representing optical phenomena» (Toulmin 1953, 
p. 26). These views apply, mutatis mutandis, to the case of Euclid’s geometry of rays, 
which can be seen, even if just in what regards the adoption of Euclid’s geometry, as a 
precursor of geometrical optics (Darrigol 2012, pp. 10-1). 
     Some of the assumptions made at the beginning of Euclid’s Optics are: 
 
 
«are staffs that indicate the length of one cubit and may include its subdivisions» 
(Imhausen 2016, p. 168). 
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«The straight lines drawn from the eye diverge to embrace the magnitudes seen. The 
figure contained by a set of visual rays is a cone of which the apex is in the eye and the 
base at the limits of the magnitudes seen. Those magnitudes are seen upon which visual 
rays fall, and those magnitudes are not seen upon which visual rays do not fall». (cited in 
Darrigol 2012, p. 9) 
 
For our purpose it will suffice to consider the first proposition of the Optics (see figure 
3): 
 
«Prop. 1: No observed magnitude is seen simultaneously as a whole. 
Call AD the observed magnitude, and B the eye from which the visual rays BA, BG, BK, 
BD fall. Since the visual rays diverge, they do not fall on the magnitude AD in a 
contiguous manner; so that there are intervals of this magnitude on which the visual rays 
do not fall. Consequently, the entire magnitude is not seen simultaneously. However, as 
the visual rays move rapidly, it is as if we saw [the entire magnitude] simultaneously». 
(cited in Darrigol 2012, p. 10) 
 
Figure 3. The diagram in proposition 1 of the Optics. 
 
Here, we are in the realm of applied geometry. As we can see in the assumptions of 
Euclid’s Optics, the geometrical segment (the straight line) is taken to represent what we 
might call a physical entity —an optical phenomenon that we might call the visual fire. 
In this way, having a new layer of representation we might call the geometrical segment 
a visual ray making reference to this new representational role. The visual fire emitted by 
the eye is described solely as a geometrical object —the visual ray (i.e. as a geometrical 
segment). Also, like in the case of visual rays, already in the assumptions, concrete 
extensions are described as magnitudes. This is made clear in proposition 1, where a 
segment AD corresponds to the observed magnitude. The eye, which has a central role in 
Euclid’s Optics as the emitter of the physical entity described geometrically as visual rays, 
is represented in the assumptions as the apex of what we might call the visual cone. This, 
when addressed in terms of planar geometry, as in proposition 1, reduces to a point: the 
point B in the figure represents the eye. Regarding the visual rays, these correspond in 
proposition 1 to the geometrical segments BA, BG, BK, and BD.  
     What is the relation of the drawn figure to the physical entities represented by 
geometrical objects? The particular relation of representation between geometrical 
figures and their corresponding geometrical object is the same as that addressed in section 
2. However, now we take the geometrical objects to represent physical phenomena or 
entities (a concrete extension, the eye, the visual fire). This means that in applied 
geometry, the geometrical figure has a double representational role, but the new role is 
indirect. The geometrical figure (or diagram) represents the geometrical object and this 
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represents a physical entity. In this way, the geometrical figure represents the physical 
entity, via the geometrical object represented by the figure.14  
     One more aspect must be noted regarding applied geometry when compared to pure 
geometry. It is not simply that geometrical objects are given a representational character. 
This is made in the context of physical assumptions regarding what is being represented 
by the geometrical objects. For example, the first assumption, at the beginning of the 
Optics, that the straight lines drawn from the eye diverge to embrace the magnitudes seen, 
is a geometrical rendering of a physical assumption. The eye is here already the apex of 
a geometrical cone; the  ‘seen’ object is a geometrical object (a segment, a rectangle, the 
arc of a circle, a sphere, or others; see Burton 1945), and the visual fire emitted by the 
eyes is a visual ray —a geometrical segment. These initial assumptions are complemented 
by what we might call further physical assumptions made in the propositions, like in the 
case of proposition 1 where we find the idea of «a fast scanning of the objects by the 
visual rays» (Darrigol 2012, p. 10). As with the case of the initial assumptions, this further 
physical assumption is presented already in terms of an assumption regarding geometrical 
objects: in proposition 1 visual rays are taken to «move rapidly» (Darrigol 2012, p. 10). 
This can be seen as a new ‘layer’ of representation of the optical phenomena. We do not 
have only the first new layer of representation (i.e., the eye, the concrete objects, and 
visual fire, as geometrical objects) that bears on points and geometrical segments on their 
own. We also have a representational role given to the diagram as a whole, which has 
implicit the physical assumption of the scanning of the concrete objects by the visual fire 
emitted by the eye. This new layer of representation implies taking the segments BA, BG, 
BK, and BD as ‘moving rapidly’, which means, e.g., the eye emitting initially BA and 
emitting successively BG, BK, and BD. The diagram would be a static image of a 
dynamical situation. In this way, this further representational role implies a particular 
reading of the diagram, which, in fact, is made explicit in the text of proposition 1. We 
can regard this further ‘layer’ of representation as implemented directly in the diagram, 
not in the individual geometrical segments whose representations —the segment 
figures— form the diagram. This is so because the complete physical situation of the eye 
emitting successively the visual fire in different directions so as to ‘cover’ the surface of 
an object, is described by the diagram and not by the individual segment figures or point 
figure that represent geometrical segments or a geometrical point (which represent the 
visual fire, a concrete extension, or the eye). There is no ‘whole’ geometrical object that 
is represented by the drawn diagram. However, the diagram has this representational role 
because of the representational role that was given to the geometrical objects represented 
in the diagram. 
 
 
§5. Conclusions 
 
14 Notice that here we are not making the case for a new interpretation of the role of 
geometrical figures that would be different from Panza’s. The new layers of 
representation are built, so to speak, on top of Panza’s ‘original’ layer. We still follow 
Panza’s view here. 
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In the practical geometry of ancient Mesopotamia, the conception of segments, circles, 
or others, is such that we cannot consider having a conception of geometrical objects. A 
geometrical figure does not represent a geometrical object. For example, we can have a 
concept of circle figure in terms of a general conceptualization of planar figures as 
determined by its boundaries —in this case, the circumference—, that is specified 
implicitly by the stipulation of its drawing with a compass and a name that makes 
reference to it as a ‘thing that curves’. The drawn circumference has a length that is 
measurable in relation to an adopted metrological system for lengths using, e.g., a small 
rope. 
     The situation with the pure geometry of the Elements is distinct. We have a sortal 
concept of segment, circle, and others. In the attributes of these conceptions, we find 
idealizations like lines having no breadth and the notion of exact length. This implies, 
e.g., that we can compare the length of two (geometrical) circumferences in terms of a 
relation of equality and order. That is, the length of two (geometrical) circumferences can 
be exactly equal or one is greater than or less than the other. However, the circle figure is 
not the geometrical circle instantiating the concept of circle. Contrary to the case of the 
practical geometry of ancient Mesopotamia, the circle is not the figure, the figure is a 
representation of the (geometrical) circle. According to Panza, the identity conditions of 
circles is given by the circle figures (or diagrams they are part of). In this way, we identify 
and distinguish two circles referred to in I.1 through the circle figures of the diagram in 
I.1.  Also, the continuity of the circles as geometrical objects is inherited by them from 
the concrete continuity of the drawings. Another attribute inherited from the diagram is 
the crossing of the circles. However, that they cross at a point does not follow directly 
from the diagram; it follows from the diagram complemented by the attribute that objects 
have due to their idealization as breadthless. 
     When applying Euclid’s pure geometry in Euclid’s Optics, we encounter new layers 
of representation. These operate in the geometrical objects represented by drawn 
segments or points or directly in the diagrams. The geometrical segments can represent 
concrete extensions or objects and, more importantly, optical phenomena. As visual rays, 
they represent a visual fire emitted by the eye which permits the visual perception. The 
eye itself is simply represented as a geometrical point. When considering the 
representation of a concrete extension, the visual fire, or the eye, as segment figures or a 
point figure within a diagram, this diagram provides a further layer of representation of 
physical assumptions. In the case of the diagram of proposition 1, the diagram represents 
the visual ‘scanning’ of an object by the successive emission of visual rays by the eye. 
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Figure 1. The diagram in I.1 of the Elements. 
 
 
 
       
 
Figure 2. Reproduction of the drawing in tablet MS 3051. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Figure 3. The diagram in proposition 1 of the Optics. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
